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There may be found matter for thought in some recent
decisions of our Supreme Court which indicate a tendency to
return, so far as may be possible, to the strict rule of the English
and Roman law that renders parol evidence inadmissible to vary
or contradict written instruments. For a century Pennsylvania
was unique in her failure to acquiesce in that doctrine. Early
decisions recognized that exceptions to the rule were admitted
in this state,' until with the multiplication of the exceptions the
rule itself was so frittered away that in Kostenbader v. Peters 2
Judge Paxson went the whole length of declaring that "the Eng'Rearick v. Swinehart, ii Pa.
Chalfant v. Williams, 35 Pa. 212.
,8o Pa. 338.

233;

Greenawalt v. Kohne, 85 Pa. 369;

EDITOR's NoTE, see p. 672, infra.
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lish rule that parol evidence is inadmissible to vary the terms
of a written instrument does not exist in this state." That statement was perhaps too broad, and the same judge more cautiously observed in the later case of Phillips v. Meily 3 that "it
would perhaps be more accurate to say that the rule has been
relaxed ;" but the extent to which the relaxation had then gone,
or the state of the law then or now, is well-nigh impossible of
definition. The decisions are helpful only as showing the varying tendencies of the court, for the difficulty of framing a statement as to the law itself has found even judicial expression. "In
the numerous cases involving the question as to when parol testimony is admissible in contradiction of written -instruments there
is much apparent and some real conflict," admits Mr. Justice Dean
in the recent case of Fuller v. Law, zO7 Pa. 1O1. 4 The rise and
growth and current limitations upon the rule that oral inducing
agreements and promises, upon the faith of which written instruments are executed, are admissible although they vary, contradict, or alter the written instruments, are, however, tendencies
clearly marked in the decisions, susceptible of demonstration;
and it is these which it is proposed to set forth in this paper.
Fortified by the concurrence of the courts for over a century in
this exception to the English rule, it cannot be dislodged by a
single decision; but there have been so many recent intimations
from the Supreme Court that the general rule will henceforth
be insisted upon to the gradual elimination of the exception that
the attention of the bar may well be called to this reactionary
tendency, and, with a statement of some of the reasons which
should compel the ultimate establishment of the strict English
rule, its assent to the current tendency of the Supreme Court won.
Outside of Pennsylvania in all English-speaking tribunals
close adherence is given to the rule that parol contemporaneous
evidence is inadmissible to contract or vary the terms of a valid
written instrument. "When parties have deliberately put their
S1io6 Pa. 536.
'See also Chief Justice Waite in Bast v. Bank, ioi U. S. 93.
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engagements into writing," says Greenleaf, ", "in such terms as
import a legal obligation, without any uncertainty as to the object
or extent of such engagement, it is conclusively presumed that the
whole engagement of the parties, and the extent and manner of
their undertaking, were reduced to writing; and all oral testimony of a previous colloquium between the parties, or of conversations or declarations at the time when it was completed, or afterwards, as it would tend in many instances to substitute a new
and different contract for the one which was really agreed upon,
to the prejudice, possibly, of one of the parties, is rejected." The
Roman law developed the same rule, expressed in the maxim,
"contra scripture testimonium, non scripture testimonium non
fertur." " Within this rule it was still permissible to introduce
evidence to attack the validity of the written instrument. Fraud,
accidenit, or mistake in procuring its execution could be shown
and reformation or rescission obtained in equity upon such
grounds. Prior to the establishment of courts of equity in Pennsylvania, relief against fraud, accident, or mistake in the execution of a written instrument could be had only in the law courts
in actions wherein the written instruments were placed in evidence. The earliest cases establishing the peculiar Pennsylvania
rule under discussion were decided by the court under the belief
that it was admitting evidence of fraud; and it is due more to the
varied uses and meanings of the term "fraud" than perhaps to
any other single cause that in the end evidence of oral, contemporaneous, inducing promises was admitted to affect and control
written instruments.
Two lines of decisions are readily traceable and distinguished in the application of the rule admitting oral, contemporaneous, inducing promises. The broader line formulated the
rule laid down in Greenawalt v. Kohne,' where Mr. Justice
Sharswood said: "Where at the execution of a writing a stipu'Greenleaf: Evidence (i6th Ed.), §275.
Art. go.
' Cod., lib. 4, tit. 20, 1. I.
'85 Pa. 369.

See also Stephen:

Evidence,
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lation has been entered into, a condition annexed, or a promise
made by word of mouth, upon the faith of which the writing has
been executed, parol evidence is admissible, though it may vary
and materially change the terms of the contract." More tersely
this rule is stated by Mr. Justice Trunkey in Building Association
v. Hetzel,8 thus: "Parol evidence is admissible to show a verbal
contemporaneous agreement, which induced the execution of a
written obligation, though it may vary or change the terms of a
written instrument." 9 Another line of decisions established the
rule that parol evidence is admissible to affect written instruments where there has been an attempt to make a fraudulent use
of the instrument in violation of a promise or agreement made
at the time the instrument was signed and without which it would
not have been signed, which promise or agreement stated the use
to which it would be put or purpose for which it was executed. 10
This rule evidently is but one phase of the broader rule first
stated, and is included in it. If oral inducing agreements are all
admissible, inducing agreements as to the use to which the instrument will be put or purpose for which it was signed are admissible. The latter are a narrower class of cases embraced in
the former general class. The distinction is, however, important. The broader rule developed from the narrower one, and
the present reactionary tendency of the Supreme Court has gone
no further than to throw a. doubt upon the soundness of the
broad rule, while it has left the narrow one unquestioned; or,
more accurately, the recent decisions seem to limit the broad rule
to cases embraced in the narrow one.
The earliest of the reported cases involving the rule is
Thompson v. White, I Dall. 424 (789), where Chief Justice
McKean admitted evidence to fasten a direct oral trust upon a
landowner whose deed, absolute on its face, was executed and
a103 Pa.

507.

"For similar statements of the rule, see Walker v. France, 112 Pa. 203;
Cullmans v. Lindsay, 114 Pa. i66; Close v. Zell, 141 Pa. 390, and Smith v.

Harvey, 4 Pa. Super. 377.
".Rearick v. Sudnehart, ii Pa. 233; Phillips v. Meily, 1o6 Pa. 536; Jackson
v. Payne, 114 Pa. 67; Cloud v. Markle, 186 Pa. 614.

-
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delivered in reliance upon his verbal promise to hold in trust for
certain named persons. In the course of his opinion he said: "It
has, indeed, been a general rule

.

.

.

that no parol proof shall

be admitted to contradict, add to, diminish, or vary from a deed
or writing. But it is certain that there are several exceptions to
this rule and many cases may be found in which parol proof has
been admitted, notwithstanding writings have been signed between the parties. For instance, where a declaration is made
before a deed is executed, shewing the design with which it was
executed, the decisions in the Court of Chancery have been
grounded upon parol proof." In these words is found the source
from which developed the rule-as yet unassailed-that the use
to which a written instrument may be put may be proved by the
oral contemporaneous promises which induced its execution.
The next case upon the subject is Wallace v. Baker, I Binn.
61o (18o9), important not so much for the point decided as for
the opinion of Chief Justice Tilghman, whose influence in establishing the Pennsylvania doctrine was easily paramount. His
statement of the colonial case of Hurst's Lessee v. Kirkbride, decided in 1773, and his concurrence in its decision, furnish the
source from which developed the broad rule under which all inducing oral promises made at the execution of a written instrument were admissible in evidence. "There have been many decisions in this court," said Tilghman, "in favor of the admission of parol evidence, even in contradiction to written instruments. These decisions have been chiefly in cases of fraud and
of trust." He then refers to Thompson v. White, supra, and
states that the leading case upon the subject is Hurst's Lessee v.
Kirkbride. That case is not in print, but from the notes of counsel in the case Tilghman was able to narrate the facts. Parol
evidence was admitted to prove that at the execution of a deed
conveying, in terms, all the lands of the vendor to one Hurst,
the parties thereto orally excepted a certain manor. Of Hurst's
conduct in subsequently laying claim to the excepted land Tilghman says, "Now it was a gross fraud in Hurst, after all that
had passed, to set up a claim to the manor." The full signifi-
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cance of Tilghman's opinion, as establishing the broad rule above
referred to, becomes clear when reference is had to the succeeding cases of Christ v. Diffenbach, I S. and R. 464 (1815), and
Campbell v. McClenachan, 6 S. and R. I7I (182o).

In the for-

mer Judge Yeates said, "I have always understood the settled
law in this government, since the decision in Hurst's Lessee v.
Kirkbride, cited-in I Binn. 616, to be, that whatever passed at
and immediately before the execution of any instrument, might
be given in evidence to impeach the fairness of the transaction."
In the latter case Tilghman said, "Parol evidence may be given
of what passed between the parties at and immediately before
the execution of a writing,

.

.

where the plaintiff was" in-

duced to execute the articles of agreement by the defendant's
promise."
In the language of the cases quoted above there is no limitation of the admissibility of parol evidence to the disclosure of
the purpose or use for which the written instrument was executed. In Christ v. Diffenbach,1 ' the facts present a typical case
within the broad rule that admitted all oral, contemporaneous,
inducing promises. There was and could be no contention that
the case was one within the narrow rule that admits evidence
to establish merely the use or purpose for which the writing was
signed. In an action of replevin for goods distrained for rent
in arrear the lessee was permitted to prove that he executed the
lease upon the faith of the lessor's oral undertaking to make
certain improvements and repairs. That Judge Yeates understood that the rule that rendered admissible all that took place
at and to induce the execution of a written instrument was an
extension of the rule admitting evidence to disclose the purpose
for which it was executed is clear from his language that "it
was bottomed on the decision of Harvey v. Harvey, 2 Ch. Cas.
I8o, that a court of equity would receive parol evidence of the
declarations made, before a deed was executed, to show its real
design and character." And that such evidence was declared to
1 Supra.
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be admissible upon the ground that it established fraud is plainly
stated by Judge Tilghman in the same case.
With the decision in Campbell v. McClenachan ended the
formative period of the rule, which for the sake of brevity may
be called the "Pennsylvania rule"-a name which at least expresses the jurisdictional limits of its authority. Championed
by Judge Tilghman, its establishment was complete with the
McClenachan case. That case was decided in 182o, and for over
sixty years, until 1882, the soundness of the rule was almost
unquestioned in the decisions. Within that period but a single
case suggests that our courts had gone too far in the admission
of parol evidence.12 The history of the rule within that period
may be briefly told. The early cases involving it were decided
upon the ground that the oral evidence was admissible to establish.the use or purpose for which the instrument was executed;
that is to say following the decision of Thompson v. White 13
they were cases within the narrow phase of the broad rule. Miller v. Henderson, IO S. and R. 290 (1823), and Lyon v. Bank 14
were the last of the decisions of Judge Tilghman upon the subject, the former containing a vigorous statement of the reasons
upon which he conceived that the rule was grounded, and which
will be the subject of further study when these reasons are considered hereafter. Judge Tilghman died in 1826, and the next
noteworthy name in connection with the rule is that of Judge
Bell, whose opinion in Rearick v. Swvinehart, II Pa. 233 (1849),
will engage respectful attention in connection with the opinion
of Tilghman just mentioned. A collection of the cases decided
before 1882 is contained in the notes. 5 Within the same period
'Martin v. Berens, 67 Pa. 459 (1871).
"i Dall. 424.
"1 4 S. and R. 283 (1826).
1"

No attempt has been made to render this list of decisions exhaustive.

After Tilghman's death came Holtz v. Wright, 16 S. and L 345 (1827), and
Oliver v. Oliver, 4 Rawle, 141 (1833). Judge Bell's decisions include Renshav
v. Gans, 7 Pa. 117 (1847); Rearick v. Swinehart, iI Pa. 233 (1849); and
Among the later decisions are
Rearick's Exec. v. Rearick, i5 Pa. 66 (850).

Lippincott v. Whitman, 83 Pa. 244 (877) ; Barclay v. Wainwright, 86 Pa. x9
(1878), and Hoopes v. Beale, go Pa. 82 (i879).
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the cases enunciating the broad rule of Campbell v. McClenachan
and Christ v. Diffenbach, that any oral, contemporaneous, inducing agreement or promise was admissible, were equally numerous,
and verbal promises or undertakings upon the faith of which the
writing was executed were frequently admitted to contradict or
vary the terms of the instrument, where no question was raised
as to the evidence establishing merely the use to which it was
agreed that the instrument should be put, or the design or purpose which-led to its execution. 6
In 1882 this middle period, constituting the hey-day of the
broad Pennsylvania rule, came to an end. Before turning to the
decisions of that year a word should be said as to some of the
influences that had developed to render a reaction possible, and
convenient opportunity will be afforded to examine with some
care the reasons upon which the rule was established.
The rejection of oral evidence to contradict, alter, or vary
written instruments is based upon grounds of policy. Coke
long ago 17 found in the "slippery memory" of witnesses sufficient reason to exclude testimony of the verbal negotiations that
preceded or accompanied the execution of the written instrument
which the parties by their own act designated as the chart of their
rights and liabilities; and judges of varying attainments have
since never ceased to sound the praises of the rule that preserves
the inviolability of the terms of a written instrument from the
assaults of witnesses whose testimony, if unbiased, is still subject to the aberrations which distort perception and memory.
In Coke's day-the bias of a witness was not more to be guarded
against than was his treacherous memory, for parties in interest
were not allowed to testify but when litigants and parties in interest were permitted to become witnesses the English parol evidence rule found another reason for existence in rendering unasChalfant v. Williams, 35 Pa. 212 (i86o) ; Powelton Coal Co. v. McShain,

75 Pa. 238 (874) ; Shugart v. Moore, 78 Pa. 469 (1875); Caley v. R. R., 8o
Pa. 363 (1876) ; Greenawalt v. Kohne, 85 Pa. 369 (1877); Keough v. Leslie,
92 Pa. 424 (188o).
" Countess of Rutland v. Earl of Rutland, 5 Rep. 26a (i6o4).
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sailable the terms of a writing against the biased testimony of interested parties.'8
Parties in interest were made competent witnesses in Pennsylvania in 1869, and it was not long thereafter before the courts
called attention to the necessity for closer adherence to the rule
excluding oral evidence to affect writings. The first note of
warning against any further extension of the relaxation of the
rule in this state was uttered in the well-known case of Martin v.
Berens,19 decided in 1871. In concluding a statement of the principles which govern the admission of parol evidence to affect
written instruments Mr. Justice Williams said: "Where parties,
without any fraud or mistake, have deliberately put their engagements in writing, the law declares the writing to be not only the
best, but the only, evidence of their agreement, and we are not
disposed to relax the rule. It has been found to be a wholesome
one, and now, that parties are allowed to testify in their own behalf, the necessity of adhering strictly to it is all the more imperative." "In cases of fraud, accident, or mistake, the rule is
different;" he had previously said, "Where equity would set aside
or reform the instrument on either of these grounds, parol evidence is admissible to contradict or vary the terms of the agreement as written."
With the above-quoted statements of Judge Williams the
law elsewhere than in Pennsylvania is in entire accord. Evidence is everywhere admitted to attack the validity of the written
instrument for mistake, for accident, or for fraud in its execution. But when in support of that rule Judge Williams cites
Christ v. Diffenbach, Miller v. Henderson, Renshaw v. Gans,
Rearick v. Swinehart, discussed above, and others of our cases in
which the parol evidence was admitted to establish inducing promises upon the faith of which writings were executed, and when he
continues and unmistakably identifies the admission of such tesTracy v. Union Iron Works, io4 Mo. 193 (i89i); Underwood v.
275 (1847).
'67 Pa. 459.

'See

Simonds, 12 Met. (Mass.)

61o
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timony with the admission of testimony to establish fraud, he
clearly reveals that while in terms it is possible to express our rule
so that it coincides with the general law. yet such verbal accord
is gained only by a perversion or extension of the meaning of the
term "fraud" as used in the English rule. There can be no doubt,
however, that Judge Williams accurately summarized the results
of our early cases.. They were decided on the theory that oral
inducing agreements were admissible because they established
fraud. Thus in Christ v. Diffenbach,20 where evidence was offered to prove that a lease had been executed on the faith of the
lessor's promise to repair and improve the leased premises, Chief
Justice Tilghman said, "The e,,idence offered in the present case
2
went directly to establish a fraud." So in Rearick v. Swinehart,'
where the court admitted evidence of an oral inducing agreement
as to the use to which the written agreement was to be put, Judge
Bell said: "In Pennsylvania, perhaps, the door has been opened
wider than elsewhere for the admission of parol proof to reform,
modify, or even to extinguish a written instrument, in cases of
fraud, mistake, or trust.

.

.

.

Nor is it essential that a fraud

was originally intended. It is enough that, though the parties
acted in mutual good faith at the inception of the transaction, an
attempt is made to wrest the instrument to a purpose not contemplated, or to use it in violation of the accompanying agreement. It is as much a fraud to obtain a paper for one purpose,
and use it for a different and unfair purpose, as to practise falsehood or deceit in its procurement." In the later case of Coal Co.
v. McShain 22. Judge Gordon said: "It is certainly permissible to
give evidence of a verbal promise made by one of the parties,
at the time of the making of a written contract, where such promise was used as an inducement to obtain the execution thereof.
This rule is put upon the ground that the attempt afterwards to take advantage of the omission from the contract of
2x

S. and R. 464.

:1 11 Pa. 233.

=75 Pa. 238 (1874).
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such promise is a fraud upon the party who was induced to execute it upon such promise, and hetice he will be permitted to show
the truth of the matter.

.

These early cases established that it was a species of fraud,
opening the door for the admission of parol testimony, for one
to obtain the execution of a written contract by means of his
oral promise, not incorporated in the writing, which he subsequently seeks to violate or repudiate. The danger of such a rule
was not lost on the court; but in the days when parties were not
competent as witnesses the reasons for the admission of the testimony prevailed over those against it. "The destruction of a
written instrument, by parol evidence, may seem dangerous, and.
in fact, it is so," wrote Chief Justice Tilghman in Miller v. Henderson,2 3 "but the comMunity would be in a still worse condition
if it were established as an inflexible rule that when a man's hand
was once got to an instrument, no matter by what means, the door
should be shut against all inquiry. The encouragement to fraudulent villainy would be so great, under such a system, that the
consequences might be intolerable." The experience of other
courts does not sustain Judge Tilghman. Fraud everywhere will
be relieved against. But the fraud that elsewhere will justify the
admission of parol evidence to affect written instruments is something other than the attempted violation or repudiation of an oral
promise made to induce the execution of a written instrument.
Outside of Pennsylvania the fraud that will render parol
evidence admissible to affect a writing is such fraud as in Pennsylvania we are familiar with as a ground for the rescission of
contracts. In brief, it consists in a misrepresentation of facts.
With the other elements of such fraud, the knowledge of the
falsehood, the intention to deceive, and the actual deception, we
need not be concerned. Similar elements may exist in the cases
in which, in Pennsylvania, oral inducing promises are admitted
to control writings. There may be the same guilty intention and
33io

S. and R. 29o.
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actual inducement to act upon the faith of the statement; but
there is the vital difference that in the one case there is a misstatement of fact, in the other, at most, a misstatement of intention, a mere promise whose fulfilment may or may not be contemplated. The law guarantees to every man about to contract
that he shall act under the influence of a conception of existing
facts free from any distortion produced by the wilful wrong of
the other party. The soundness of his knowledge or concep-.
tion of the facts being thus preserved, as a basis upon which he
may enter into contractual relations, from the fraudulent misrepresentations of his co-contractor, he is left in reducing his
contract to writing to secure his rights by himself. He is conclusively bound by the writing, and must incorporate in it whatever terms he may desire to enforce. Against fraudulent misrepresentation of fact by the party with whom he is dealing one
cannot always guard. The law will protect him. For the securing of rights under a contract to be reduced to writing one can
protect himself; and, in order to prevent perjury, the sanction
which attaches to the terms of a contract is afforded by law to
only the written terms when the contract is reduced to writing.
Such is the general law elsewhere than in Pennsylvania. The
same arguments that in Pennsylvania prevailed to admit of the
reception of evidence of oral promises and engagements to affect
writings whose execution they induced have been made in other
courts, but misrepresentation of intention has elsewhere not been
confused with misrepresentation of fact or identified with
fraud.2 4 It will be recalled that Judge Gordon in Coal Co. v.
"The extent to which our courts confused the admission of evidence to
establish inducing promises on the faith of which writings were executed with
the admission of evidence to establish actual fraud-misrepresentation of factis shown in Walker v. France, 112 Pa. 2o3. In that case the defence against an
action to recover the balance of purchase money due under a written contract for
the sale of land was that the vendor had stated that upon the land there were
ten million feet of hemlock and certain improvements, which statements were
false, but upon the faith of which the defendant had contracted. This defence
was clearly one of fraudulent misrepresentation of facts-actual fraud. The
court above declared that the evidence was admissible under the authorities establishing the principle that a written agreement may be modified or altogether set
aside by parol evidence of an oral promise or undertaking made at the time the
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McSkain 25 held that one was estopped from taking advantage of
the omission of an oral promise from a written contract whose
execution it induced on the ground that to take advantage of the
omission would work a fraud upon the party who was thus induced to execute the contract. In Insurance Co. v. Mowry, 96 U.
S. 544 (1877), an action upon an insurance policy was defended
on the ground that under the terms of the policy the company
was released by failure of the assured to pay the premium at
maturity. The plaintiff contended that the defendant was
estopped from making such defence by reason of the fact that he
had been induced to take out the policy on the faith of the promise of the company's agent that the company would inform him
of the date when premiums were due so that he would know when
to pay them, and that the company had failed to inform him of
the date of the maturity of the premiuni he had omitted to pay.
Said Mr. Justice Field:
"The previous representation of the agent could in no
respect operate as an estoppel against the company. Apart
from the circumstance that the policy subsequently issued
alone expressed its contract, an estoppel from the representations of a party can seldom arise, except where the representation relates to a matter of fact-to a present or past
state of things. If the representation relate to something
to be afterwards brought into existence, it will amount only
to a declaration of intention or of opinion, liable to modification or abandonment upon a change of circumstances of
which neither party can have any certain knowledge. The
only case in which a representation as to the future can be
writing was signed and inducing the other to sign it. The same defence in a

similar action was made in Atherholt v. Hughes, 2og Pa. i56. Evidence of the
misrepresentations was rejected by the trial court on the ground that under
Martin v. Berens the written agreement could not be affected by such parol evidence. In reversing the judgment of the lower court Mr. Justice Fell points out
with admirable clearness the distinction between such evidence, to establish actual
fraud, which is admissible under all constructions of the parol evidence rule,
and evidence intended merely to alter or vary the terms of a written contract.
"75 Pa. 238, supra, page 6io.
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held to operate as an estoppel is where it relates to an intended abandonment of an existing right, and is made to influence others, and by which they have been induced to act.
An estoppel cannot arise from a promise as to future action
with respect to a right to be acquired under an agreement
not yet made.
"The doctrine of estoppel is applied with respect to representations of a party, to prevent their operating as a fraud
upon one who has been led to rely upon them. They would
have that effect, if a party who, by his statement as to matters of fact, or as to his intended abandonment of existing
rights, has designedly induced another to change his conduct
or alter his condition in reliance upon them, can be permitted to deny the truth of his statements, or enforce his rights
against his declared intention of abandonment. But the doctrine has no place for application when the statement relates to rights depending on contracts yet to be made, to
which the person complaining is to be a party. He has it in
his power in such cases to guard in. advance against any consequences of a subsequent change of intention and conduct
by the person with whom he is dealing. For compliance
with arrangements respecting future transactions, parties
must provide by stipulations in their agreements when reduced to writing."

26

The reasoning of our courts, in admitting parol evidence
of oral, contemporaneous, inducing promises or undertakings
upon the ground of fraud, it seems to the writer, cannot be sustained. It seems clear also that upon reasons of policy they erred
in admitting such evidence to vary or contradict the terms of
written instruments. Notwithstanding the dangers to which
Judge Tilghman calls attention in Miller v. Henderson,27 if such
'See

also Seitz v. Refrigerating Co., 141 U. S. 5io; Naumberg v. Young,

. R.
V N.27io LSJ.
S. 332.
and

290.

See page 611.
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evidence is not received, the uncertainty of memory and temptation to perjury afford stronger reasons for the exclusion of such
evidence. The act of assembly making parties ,in interest competent witnesses first effectively brought home to the court the
force of these reasons, and in Martin v. Berens 2 the necessity
for strict adherence to the parol evidence rule was first announced. Our loose construction of that rule, however, remained unaltered by any judicial decision until 1882. In that
year the court began to heed the warning contained in Martin v.
Berens, and in Thorne et al. v. Warfflein 21 Judge Green declared:
"It is not enough that there are parol stipulations contradictory
of a written agreement in order to change its legal effect. There
must be fraud, accident, or mistake, and the evidence of either
must be clear, precise, and indubitable. We have gone very far
in permitting parol contemporaneous evidence to defeat written
instruments. To go farther would be to practically abrogate the
rule

.

.

.

We cannot agree that it is proper to throw the

whole case into the jury-box on the ground of fraud simply because one of two parties to a written contract testifies that there
were parol stipulations contradictory to the terms of the writing
agreed to at the same time. There must be evidence of fraud
other than that which may be derived from the mere difference
in the parol and written terms."
At this time however, the court still regarded oral inducing promises admissible if fraud was properly alleged in the
pleadings, considering that such evidence established fraud. The
change in the attitude of the court was not so much in a more
rigid enforcement of the general rule as in a closer supervision
of the character and quantity of evidence necessary to bring the
case within the exception. In JuniataBuilding Ass'n v. Hetzel4' 0
Thomas v. Loose,3 and Cullmans v. Lindsay 32 the court repeatedly affirmed the rule that a written agreement may be modified
'67

Pa. 459.

See page 6og.

30103 Pa. 507 (1883),
2114 Pa. io7 (1886).

"ioo Pa. 519.
31114 Pa. 35 (1886).
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or contradicted by parol evidence of oral promises or undertakings made by one of the parties at the time of, and as an inducement to, the execution of the written contract; but in each case
the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower court
which had admitted the evidence and remitted the case for a new
trial because the evidence either in quantity, quality, or character
failed to establish the inducing agreement clearly, precisely, and
indubitably. The inducing agreement, those cases held, could be
established only by evidence sufficient to satisfy the conscience
of a chancellor in equity proceedings. Oath against oath was
not sufficient; the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness
with corroborating circumstances was requisite.
So long, however, as the court held that oral inducing agreements could be proved, manifestly, whatever may have been the
restrictions placed upon the character, quantity, or quality of the
testimony necessary to establish them, oral inducing agreements
would continue to be relied on to vary written instruments, the
necessary evidence to establish them would be forthcoming, and
writings would continue to be the subject of attack just the same
as before Martin v. Berens. The writer is far from suggesting
that our courts have receded altogether from their old position,
but it does seem to him that they have retreated sufficiently to
venture the assertion that while oral inducing agreements may
still be proved to establish the use to which any writing, sealed
or parol, may be put, yet other oral inducing agreements may not
be proved. This last statement may be made with some confidence in the case of writings under seal, but if recent decisions
are properly conceived by him the inhibition upon the proof of
oral inducing agreements, other than those which establish the
use to which the instrument may be put, extends as well to unsealed as to sealed writings.
In Phillipsv.Reilly, io6 Pa. 536, Mr. Justice Paxson wrote:
"The cases in this state in which parol evidence has been allowed
to contradict or vary written instruments may be classed under
two heads: First, where there was fraud, accident, or mistake
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in the creation of the instrument, and, second where there has
been an attempt to make a frauduleit use of the instrument, in
violation of a promise or agreement made at the time the instrument was signed, and without which it would not have been executed." :: At the time when this r~sum6 of our law was written oral, contemporaneous, inducing promises subsequently repudiated or violated, we have seen, were held to be admissible
because they were considered as establishing fraud in the creation
of the instrument whose execution they induced. The reasoning urged in support of that view has already been examined
and the conclusion drawn that such evidence did not establish
"fraud" in the usual acceptation of that term; that misrepresentation of intention was not the equivalent of misrepresentation of
fact as a constituent of fraud. The current of recent decisions
seems to be based upon that distinction. By a construction of the
word "fraud" such as is accepted elsewhere our courts may still
repeat the language of Phillips v. Meily, and adhere to the letter
of the rule there laid down, but they have altered its content and
meaning, for no longer does the breach or repudiation of oral
promises or undertakings, upon the faith of which written instruments were executed, seem to constitute fraud and render the
evidence admissible under the first of the classes named in Phillips v. Meily. This altered attitude of the courts was first worked
out in cases of sealed instruments. The evolution in cases of instruments not under seal was later, perhaps is not yet complete.
In Irvin v. Irvin, 142 Pa. 271 (189i), an action was brought
upon a note given to the plaintiff under the provisions of a written agreement under seal whereby the plaintiff, a married woman,
released her rights in her husband's estate. The defendant was
allowed to prove at the trial of the cause that at the execution of
the sealed agreement it was agreed that the note should not be
.' Similar statements of the law are found in the later cases of Jackson v.

Payne, 114 Pa. 67 (i886) ; Honesdale Glass Co. v. Storm, 125 Pa. 268 (1889) ;
Hoffmann v. R. R., 157 Pa. 174 at 195 (1893); Cooper v. Potts, z85 Pa. 112
(1898) ; Cloud v. Markle, 186 Pa. 614 (i898), and Fry v. Glass Co., 2o7 Pa. 5o5
(904).
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sued on until the plaintiff had obtained a divorce from her husband. In holding the admission of this testimony to be error
Mr. Justice Paxson said: "I know of no decided case and no principle of law which permits an oral contract, made at the same
time with a written contract under seal, and purposely omitted
therefrom, to be set up not only to contradict but to destroy it.
The two agreements cannot possibly stand together--one or the
other must fall. When. parties without fraud or mistake have
put their engagements in writing, that is not only the best, but the
sole evidence of their agreement." In that case, it is true, there
was no allegation that the alleged oral agreement was the inducement on the faith of which the writing was executed; but in thesubsequent case of Wodock v. Robinson, 148 Pa. 503 (1893),
where such an inducing oral agreement was attempted to be
proved to vary the terms of a sealed instrument, the same rule
was enunciated and the evidence excluded. Wodock v. Robinson
is the leading case in support of the view that sealed instruments
may not now be modified by evidence of oral, contemporaneous,
inducing promises that do not relate to the use to which the instrument is to be put. How completely the rule it lays down is
at variance with the earlier rule that such evidence was admissible may best be shown by a statement of the facts of that case
and of a similar case decided in the early years of the history
of the rule under discussion.
In Wodock v. Robinson the plaintiff offered to prove that at
the execution of a lease. for certain demised premises, which obligated the lessee to maintain the premises in repair, the landlord
agreed orally to put them in good repair, and that upon the faith
of such promise the lessee was induced to execute the lease. A
similar offer was made to establish the same facts in Christ v.
Diffenbach,34 decided in 1815, and the evidence was declared to
be admissible. The subsequent breach of such an inducing promise, at that time, was held to constitute fraud sufficient to render
the evidence admissible.3 5 Shortly before the decision of Wo3,

1 S. and R. 464.

:' See page 61o above.
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dock v. Robiinson a case presenting the same facts as in Christ v.
Diffenbach came before the Supreme Court in Eberle v. Bonafon's Executors.3" The court's conception of fraud seems to
have changed since the time of Christ v. Diffenbach, for though
the facts were substantially the same, the court held shortly that
the offer did "not tend to establish fraud, mistake, or trust. Its
purpose is to establish a contemporaneous parol agreement to
change the effect of the written contract," and the offer of such
evidence was held to have been properly rejected. The decision
in Wodock v. Robinson followed in the course laid out in Eberle
v. Bonafon's Executors, Judge Thayer saying: "In the case now
before us, as it is presented in the statement filed, the effort is, as
it was in Eberle v. Bonafon's Executors, not only to strike out by
parol a solemn covenant in a' written and sealed instrument, but
to write in its place another agreement flatly contradictory of it.
No court should lend its aid to such an experiment." In declaring the rule as to sealed instruments he said: "It is as true now
as it ever was, and is a rule too firmly rooted in justice and honesty to be easily eradicated from any system of wise laws, that
all negotiations, all conversations, all oral promises, all verbal
agreements, are forever merged in, superseded, and extinguished
by the sealed instrument which is the final outcome and result of
the bargaining of the parties. Unless you aver fraud or mistake
you can no more incorporate in it what does not there appear
than you can make and seal a new bond for the parties without
their consent. You can no more blot out a word which it contains than you can tear off the signatures and seals of the parties."
"7

37

W. N. C. 335 (1886).

"This vigorous opinion of Judge Thayer may well be studied at greater
leigth. Upon the general rule he said: "Manent littere scripte is still the rule.
The written instrument shall stand as the sole exponent of the minds of the
parties. If it were not for this rule, no man would be able to protect himself by
the most solemn forms and attestations against falsehood, misrepresentation, and
perjury. In this matter the common law and the civil law are fully agreed, for
contra scriptum testnonium, non scripturn testinonium non fertur is the language of the code: Code, lib. 4, tit. 20. The cases upon this subject are myriad,
many of them at first blush seemingly inharmonious, contradictory, and irrecon-"
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"

The effect of the decisions in the cases of Irvin v. Irvin,
Eberle v. Bonafon's Executors, and Wodock v. Robinson in establishing the principle that evidence of oral inducing promises.
other than those which declare the uses to which the instrument
should be put, may not be admitted to vary or contradict the
terms of sealed instruments is shown in the case of Stull v.
Thompson, 154 Pa. 43. In an action to recover rent reserved in
a lease the lessee offered to prove that as to a portion of the sum
of money so reserved the parties had agreed at the execution of
the lease that the lessee could make -payment by boarding the lessor, and that the lease had been signed upon the faith of this
agreement. The evidence was rejected, and upon appeal the Supreme Court-said: "To reverse this case would be going further
than we have ever yet gone in allowing a written instrument
under seal to be contradicted by parol evidence. We have gone
quite far enough in that direction, especially in view of the law
of evidence as it now exists, which permits a party in interest to
testify. The rent under the lease was reserved in money, and
the offer

.

.

.

was to show that at least a portion of the rent

was to be taken out in boarding. This was a direct contradiction of the terms of the lease, and was properly excluded."
When attention is turned to the recent development of the
rule with respect to instruments not under seal there is manifest the same tendency to refuse to consider that fraud, rendering parol evidence admissible, is established by evidence of oral
promises contemporanous with and inducing the execution of a
cilable with the established rule and with other adjudications. But often the
contradiction is only apparent and not real, and dependent upon special circumstances which clearly bring the case within the recognized exceptions of fraud,
accident, or mistake. However judges and courts may have differed in the application of the rule, no judge has had the hardihood to deny it, or to refuse to
apply it in a clear case, free from the qualifying circumstances which bring it
within the operation of the exceptions." After an examination of Hunter v.
McHose, ioo Pa. 38; Jackson v. Payne, 114 Pa. 67, and Eberle v. Bonafon's
Exec., supra, he said, "The three cases which I have referred to should stand
forever as perpetual landmarks and towers of defence in this state against all
such attempts to overthrow the solemn agreements in writing of the parties by
substituting for them the uncertain and perishable recollection of parties or
bystanders, or, what is perhaps more frequently the case, their prevaricating,
dishonest, and fraudulent statements."
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written instrument, and where such evidence has been offered its
rejection has been repeatedly held to have been warranted. The
decisions to that effect are clear. The difficulty in formulating
the conclusion that parol inducing promises are not admissible
(unless they prove the use or purpose for which the instrument
was executed) is due to numerous dicta that such evidence is
admissible. It is submitted, however, that the decisions now prevail over these dicta and that the tendency is to establish the same
rule in cases of unsealed as in sealed instruments. Intrinsically
there is no reason for making any distinction between the two.
Both sealed and unsealed instruments are subject to modification
in cases of actual fraud,-fraudulent misrepresentation of fact,and if in the one case evidence of inducing promises that the
parties might well have incorporated in their writings is treated
as no evidence of fraud, there is no reason why the same rule
should not obtain with the other class of instruments. Where decisions and dicta are so conflicting; and in the absence of any
clear, authoritative statement from the Supreme Court, one would
be bold who would essay to define the law unqualifiedly, or who
would declare that it is laid down in any single case. A trend of
authority is discoverable, however, and the current tendency ascertained not from one but from a number of cases. No more
than this will be attempted.
The comparison of Huckestein v. Kelly, 139 Pa. 201 (189o),
with Dixon-Woods Co. v. Glass Co., 169 Pa. 167 (895), will

disclose the recent reactionary tendency. The facts of the two
cases are substantially alike. In each a contractor sued an owner
to recover the stipulated sum for work done under a building
contract, providing for the completion of the work by a given
date. In each case there was urged in defence that the work was
not completed by the stipulated time; and in each the plaintiff
replied that his default was caused by the failure of the defendant to perform an oral undertaking made by him at the execution
of the written contract upon the faith of which he had contracted
to perform the work by a given date; the oral undertaking in
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the one case being to construct a railroad switch to facilitate the
delivery of materials, and in the other being a promise to furnish
room for the storage of material to facilitate performance. In
the early case the testimony of the oral, 'contemporaneous, inducing promise was admitted, with the result that the court permitted the jury practically to strike from the written contract
the parties' own -formal undertaking. In the latter case the offer
was rejected and the Supreme Court, affirming the court below.
said: "As plaintiff had offered in evidence the written agreement,
and relied on it as a ground of recovery, we do not think it was
competent to set up a contemporaneous parol agreement in rebuttal of defendant's claim for damages. It was not a failure
on part of defendant to perform any part of the written contract
or any act of defendant subsequent to it, not intended by it, but
the offer was to prove a failure to perform another and a parol
agreement, made at the same time as the written one; no fraud
or mistake was alleged which would authorize a modification of
the writing. The introduction in rebuttal of such new matter
was not warranted by any rule of evidence." "No fraud was alleged," wrote Judge Dean. We may ponder well over that statement. Does it not mean that, contrary to Christ v. Diffenbach,
Campbell v. McClenachan, Coal Co. v. McShain, and the host of
early authorities, and the Huckestein Case, as well, fraud is not
established by proof of an oral contemporaneous inducing undertaking subsequently violated, and that such evidence is not admissible to vary, modify, or contradict the terms of written instruments ?

Too much weight must not be given, however, to a single
decision. The light that seemed to shine for Judge Dean in
Dixon-Woods Co. v. Glass Co. failed to illuminate the pen of
Judge Williams when, two years later, in Coal and Iron Co. v.
Willing, i8o Pa. 165 (1897), he wrote, in quite the same vein as
the judges of early days: "The existence of a contemporaneous
parol agreement between the parties under the influence of which
a note or contract has been signed, which is violated as soon as
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it has accomplished its purpose in securing the execution of the
paper, may always be shown when the enforcement of the paper
is attempted. It is a plain fraud to secure the execution of an instrument by representations as to the manner in which payment
shall be made differing in important particulars from those contained in the paper, and, after the paper has been signed, attempt
to compel literal compliance with its terms, regardless of the contemporaneous agreement without which it would never have been
signed at all." And this statement of the law that learned and
able judge declared was sustained by Martin v. Kline, 157 Pa.
473, and Martin v. Fridenburg, 169 Pa. 447. What forgetfulness of Stull v. Thompson,38 decided but four years before! what
misconstruction of Martin v. Kline and Martin v. Fridenburg!
In Stull v. Thompson the court had refused to hear oral evidence of inducing promises as to the manner in which rent reserved in a lease should be paid. In Martin v. Kline actual fraud
was proved-misrepresentation of facts. In Martin v. Fridenburg the court clearly placed the decision upon the ground that
the writing sued on was but part of an entire contract, the balance of which was also in writing. Yet the decision of Coal and
Iron Co. v. Willing might have been placed upon unquestioned
grounds. It was an action upon promissory notes liability upon
which, it was orally, agreed, was to arise only upon the occurrence of certain contingencies. It is universal law that the existence of any separate oral argument, constituting a condition precedent to the attaching of any obligation under a contract, may
be proved.

39

The reactionary tendency was not stayed by Iron Co. v.
Willing, however. When next the question arose in Storage Co.
v. Speck, 194 Pa. 126 (1899), the rule of Wodock v. Robinson
= 154

Pa. 43 (1893).

See page 62o above.
" Stephens, Digest of the Law of Evidence, Art. go, para. 3. The effort in
the case was to prove that the notes were given merely as collateral security, to
be used only after other security was exhausted. The decision might also have
been based upon our Pennsylvania rule that the use to which a note may be put
may be proved by parol : cf. page 628, infra.
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and Irvin v. Irvin, which those decisions laid down for sealed instruments, was applied to an unsealed instrument, just as was
done in Dixon-Woods Co. v. Glass Co.
In the Storage Company case action was brought to recover
for the storage of whiskey under warehouse receipts providing
for the payment of storage charges every six months. The trial
court refused to admit evidence offered by the defendant to prove
that he was induced to enter into the contract with the plaintiff
upon the faith of an oral agreement that charges should be paid
only when the whiskey was withdrawn from storage. Chief Justice Sterrett, upon appeal, after quoting at length from Martin
v. Berens, Wodock v. Robinson, and Irvin v. Irvin, said: ". . .
there is no reference in any of said papers to the oral agreement
set up by the defendant, or to any of its terms; nor was there any
evidence introduced or offered for the purpose of explaining the
omission, or of showing that it was not intentional, or that it was
caused by fraud or mistake. Neither of the excluded offers of
evidence went any further than. to show that the whiskey was
stored on the faith of the alleged oral agreement." Here, at
length, is a clear intimation from the court that the broad class of
oral, inducing agreements are not admissible to vary or contradict the terms of written instruments, and that the violation of
such agreements does not constitute fraud. The language of the
court all the more strongly sustains that position in view of the
fact that the appellant relied upon the. old rule under which such
inducing agreements were admissible and cited in support thereof
Thomas v. Loose,4" Walker v. France,4 ' and others of the cases
supporting the old rule.
Despite the plain language of Storage Co. v. Speck, and despite his own opinion in Dixon-Woods Co. v. Glass Co., from
which quotation was made above, 42 Judge Dean said in Sutch's
Estate, 201 Pa. 305 (i9o2): "The rule in this state, as we have

endeavored to adhere to it, is comprehensively announced thus, in
4

114 Pa.

35. See page 615 above.
'Page 621.

41

112

Pa. 203.
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Thomas & Sons v. Loose, 114 Pa. 35: 'Parol evidence is admissible of a contemporaneous oral agreement which induced the execution of a written contract, though it may vary, change, or reform the instrument.

.

.

.1"

That statement, as was a similar

one by the same judge in Ogden v. Traction Co., 202 Pa. 481
(19o2), was mere dictum; but it shows the doubt with which not
only the Supreme Court as a body, but its members individually,
regard the rule under discussion. Yet it was the decision of the
same judge, Dean, in the late case of Fuller v. Law, 207 Pa. 1i
(1903), which, following in the line of his decision in DixonWoods Co. v. Glass Co., has apparently settled the course of the
law. One other recent decision besides Fuller v. Law merits attention that of Krueger v. Nicola, 205 Pa. 38 (19o3). Those
two cases, in connection with the cases discussed above, seem to
establish definitely that the law is as it was ruled in Storage Co.
v. Speck.
In Krueger v. Nicola Mr. Justice Brown wrote: "To contradict or vary the terms of a written contract by an oral, contemporaneous agreement between the parties there must be allegation as well as proof, not only of it, but of its omission through
fraud, accident, or mistake from the writing." In Fuller v. Law
the defendant in an action upon a promissory note offered testimony of an oral agreement of the plaintiff contemporaneous
with and inducing its execution, that payment was to be made
from the dividends upon stock in a corporation which had failed
to declare or pay dividends. The offer was rejected, and, upon
appeal, Mr. Justice Dean said: ".

.

.

the court below placed its

ruling on the ground that the offer, even if sustained, was not
proof of such fraud, accident, or mistake in the execution and
delivery of the writing as rendered it admissible. In this the
court was correct; the proposed evidence amounted to nothing
more than an offer to prove an independent parol contract, that
the note was to be paid in another method than that expressed on
its face. It is straining both legal and moral definitions to call the
mere failure to perform an oral promise to accept payment in a
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particular form a fraud; dishonest it may be, but it is no more a
legal fraud than the immediate collection of a past due debt on
which the creditor has orally promised the debtor indulgence. As
there was no fraud in the creation of the instrument, nor in not
waiting until the dividends on the stock paid it, it comes under the
rulings

.

.

holding that evidence of fraud, accident, or mis-

take can alone successfully contradict or set aside the writing."
Here, again, Judge Dean declares that the violation of an oral,
contemporaneous, inducing agreement does not constitute fraud,
and that such evidence is not admissible. His opinion is in line
with Storage Co. v. Speck, and his own opinion in Dixon-Woods
Co. v. Glass Co. It lays deserved emphasis upon the principle
that misrepresentation of intention or mere breach of a promise
is not fraud, and, the language of Judge Williams in Coal and
Iron Co. v. Willing to the contrary notwithstanding, it holds with
Stull v. Thompson that the manner of making payment as provided in the written instrument may not be altered by evidence
of an oral inducing agreement..
From this review of the authorities, the reactionary tendency
of the Supreme Court is made manifest.4 3 Indeed, Judge Dean,
in Fuller v. Law, leaves the intention of the court in no doubt
when he says: "Since the legislation

.

.

.

allowing the parties

to such [i. e., written] instruments to testify in their own behalf,
we have endeavored to save whatever is left of the rule 'that
iparol evidence is inadmissible to vary or contradict written instruments' by somewhat more rigid rulings tending to exclude
parol evidence. We concede, success in that direction has not as
yet been what we hoped for." While it seems that no longer
"Little light can be gained by a study of the decisions of the Superior
Court. That court, established at a time when the reactionary tendency of the
Supreme Court had hardly gotten under way, adopted the rule as laid in the old
cases, and has continued to affirm it, apparently unaware of any change in the
attitude of the Supreme Court. In Snith v. Harvey, 4 Pa. Super. 377 (1897),
Judge Smith held that any oral agreement contemporaneous with and inducing
the execution of a written agreement may be proved although it vary or change
the written terms. The same rule was followed in Osbornte v. Walley, 8 Pa.
Super. 193; Harrow Co. v. Swoope, 16 Pa. Super. 451; Commonwealth Title Co.
v. Fols, i9 Pa. Super. 28; Myers v. ,Kipp,20 Pa.. Super. 311, and other Superior
Court cases.
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may the broad class of oral, contemporaneous, inducing promises
be given in evidence to contradict or vary the terms of written
instruments, yet the courts have consistently maintained the narrower rule that when the oral promise or undertaking relates to
and defines the use to which the instrument may be put the evidence is admissible. It is in the reconsideration of this rule and
in its restatement, after critical examination, that there is something yet to be achieved by the Supreme Court in the execution
of its purpose avowed in Fuller v. Law.
The reasoning on which Judge Bell, in Rearick v. Swinehart," and Judge Tilghman, in Miller v. Henderson,45 declared
that oral evidence was admissible to prove the use to which the
parties agreed that the written instrument should be put, is the
same as that on which the broad class of oral inducing agreements were declared to be admissible. Fraud was thought to be
established by the violation of either of such agreements. In the
language of the cases the fraudulent use of a written instrument
may be proved by evidence of oral agreements inducing its execution and stipulating for the use to which the instrument should
be put. Inasmuch as the evidence in such cases establishes not the
statement or representation of facts on the basis of which the
contract is made, but an undertaking or promise as to future
action for which provision might well be made in the writing,
which is supposed to contain the mutual stipulations of the parties for their future conduct and relations, the objections to the
admission of parol evidence to establish the use to which the instruments may be put are as strong as the objections to the admission of oral testimony to prove any other inducing promise.
When the cases are examined in which the parol evidence
was admitted upon the ground that it established the use to which
the instrument may be put, it appears that in many of them the
evidence establishes a condition precedent to the existence of any
obligation under the instrument; in others the evidence estab"i1 Pa. 233. See page
"1 o S. and R. 29o.

61o above.
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lishes what may be literally called the use to which the instrument may be put, as, for instance, that it was given as collateral
security against a particular liability, while in others the evidence
establishes a mere inducing agreement which relates in no way
to the use to which the instrument may be put or the purpose for
which it was given, although the court places the admission of the
testimony upon that ground.
When parties at the time of the execution of a written instrument orally agree that its operation shall be dependent upon
the occurrence of a stipulated contingency, until which time no
obligation under the instrument shall attach, it is general law
that parol evidence to establish such an oral agreement is admissible. 46 Such evidence does not vary or contradict the terms
of the writing; it merely establishes the conditions under which
it becomes operative. No criticism can be placed upon the admission of such testimony in the cases that have arisen in Pennsylvania, but its admission should be placed upon that gfound.
In Rearick v. Swinehart,47 where. the liability of the defendant
under a written agreement was conditioned upon an event that

an
had not occurred, judge Bell said: "It is enough that .
attempt is made to wrest the instrument to a purpose not contemplated, or use it in violation of the accompanying agreement.
It is as much a fraud to obtain a paper for one purpose, and use
it for a different and unfair purpose, as to practise falsehood or
deceit in its procurement." There is no more fraud in attempting to enforce liability in such case than there is in any other case
where no liability exists. The attempt may be in breach of the

contract stipulating the contingencies upon whose happening lia48
bility is to accrue, but breach of contract is not fraud
4' Stephens: Evidence, Article go; cf. lb., illustrations f and g and cases
cited. Wharton: Evidence, § 927.
" ii Pa. 233. See page 6o9 above.
"For other cases where the oral evidence admitted established a condition
precedent to the attaching of any obligation under the writing, see Dazidson's
Executors v. Young, 167 Pa. 265, similar in facts to Rearick v. Swinehart, and
Ayer's App., 28 Pa. 179. Compare also Clinch Valley Coal, etc., Co. v. Willing,
i8o Pa. 65, and Martin v. Fridenburg,i69 Pa. 447.
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The second class of these so.called fraudulent use cases
comprises those in which a bond or note is made or endorsed for.
a specific purpose, and the use to which the instrument may be put
is expressly agreed upon orally. Under our rule oral evidence
is admissible to establish the use agreed upon, and any other use
will be prevented by the courts. Bona fide holders of negotiable
instruments for value, ignorant of oral restrictions made by the
maker or endorser as to their use, may, of course, enforce them
according to their legal tenor but all other parties are bound by
the oral stipulations. Thus in Bank v. Dunn, I51 Pa. 228, a typical case, the accommodation maker of a note delivered it to the
payee with the restriction that he use it to obtain a loan. Instead
of using it in that manner he pledged it with the plaintiff as security for an antecedefit debt. Recovery upon the instrument
w s not permitted. "The expression of this one purpose was the
exclusion of every other, and a restriction upon the manner in
which the note should be used," said the court. Numerous other
cases establish the same rule, although the general law elsewhere
is that such oral agreements between parties to negotiable instruments are inadmissible. 49 Frequent application of the rule
is made in cases where upon the execution of a bond accompanying
a mortgage it is orally agreed, as the inducement for the execution of the bond, that general liability upon the bond shall be
restricted, the amount of the bond to be collected out of the mortgaged land and no personal liability incurred. 50
The rule that evidence of oral inducing agreements as to
the use to which written instruments may be put is apparently
firmly established in our Pennsylvania law. At this late date,
perhaps, the courts cannot retrace their steps and declare such
evidence inadmissible; but they can exercise closer supervision
' Other Pennsylvania cases include Miller v; Henderson, io S. and R. 29o;
Lyon v. Bank, 14 S. and R. 383; Hultz v. Wright, 16 S. and R. 345; Ott v..
Oyer, zo6 Pa. 6, and Heist v. Tobias, 182 Pa. 442. In Martin v. Cole, 104 U. S.
3o, the authorities are reviewed and the prevailing rule is defined.
"Irwin v. Shoemaker, 8 W. and S. 75; Greenawalt v. Kohne, 85 Pa. 369;
Hoopes v. Beale, go Pa. 82; Schweyer v. Walbert, 19o Pa. 334, and Wheatley v.
Neidich, 24 Pa. Super. 198.
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over the evidence offered under that rule and reject it where it
fails to establish what is literally the use to which the instrument
may be put, or a condition precedent. In their broad construction of the rule they have admitted testimony which established
an ordinary inducing agreement in conflict with the terms of the
instrument upon the ground that a "fraudulent" use was thus
prevented, although the evidence failed to establish either a condition precedent or a restriction upon the use to which the instrument should be put.5 There is a sense in which an attempt to
enforce the terms of a written instrument, despite an oral inducing agreement at variance therewith and not relating to the intended use of the instrument, may be said to be an abuse of the
instrument. If oral evidence is admissible to show all such
"abuses," then all oral inducing agreements are admissible although they establish neither an agreement restricting the use of
the written instrument, nor a condition precedent. The abuse in
such case consists in an attempt to enforce the instrument as it
is written, and not in actually using- it in another than the exclusive manner agreed upon. Unless the courts resolutely exclude
all such evidence the rule under which inducing agreements restricting the use of the instrument is admissible will be so extended as to include all oral, contemporaneous inducing agreements.
Much has been done by the Supreme Court in narrowing
the peculiar Pennsylvania exception to the parol evidence rule.
It has called attention to the reasons that make for closer adherence to the strict rule. It has declared that the broad class of oral
inducing promises are not admissible to vary, alter, or contradict
the terms of sealed instruments. Recent decisions seem to establish the same rule for written instruments not under seal. Assuming this to be the present state of the law, it can be asserted
that, as in other jurisdictions, so in Pennsylvania, except to prove
fraud, accident. or mistake, parol evidence is not admissible to
'

See Renshaw v. Gans, 7 Pa. 117; Lippincott v. Whitnan, 83 Pa. 244;

Glass Co. v. Storms,

125

Pa. 2 68.
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alter vary or contradict the terms of .a written instrument save
only that in the one case where such evidence establishes an oral
agreement contemporaneous with and inducing the execution of
the written agreement and restricting the use to which it may be
put, such evidence is still admissible. Much remains yet to be
done by the Supreme Court. An authoritative statement from it
defining the law is needed; and, if the definition accord with the
above conclusions, it should restrict the admission of oral inducing
agreements to cases in which they establish either a condition
precedent to the attaching of any obligation under the instrument, or a restriction upon the manner in which the instrument
may be used. In admitting testimony for the last-named purpose
we still are at variance with the general rule elsewhere; but the
rule seems to be too firmly mbedded in our law to be dislodged.
It should not be extended, however, nor should it be so loosely
construed that, under the pretext of establishing an oral agreement restricting the use to which a written instrument may be
put, skilful counsel may be permitted to prove an oral, inducing
agreement that provides nothing as to the use of the instrument.
Stanley Fo~z.

